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ABSTRACT 
Using KLD data on more than 900 company's performance over a nine year period in 
seven areas of corporate social responsibility (environment, community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product quality), this 
research note re-tests Michelon et al. (2013) proxies for prioritization and strategic 
approaches to CSR. The results show that, when a company pursues CSR initiatives 
that are linked to stakeholder preferences and allocates resources to these initiatives in 
a strategic way, the positive effect of its CSR initiatives on financial Corporate 
Performance (CP) strengthen. The analysis of KLDs’ variance and top tiers is thus 
proposed as a parsimonious way to measure when companies link their CSR 
initiatives to salient stakeholder preferences and undertake the corporate social 
actions that are ultimately relevant to the company’s strategy and financials. 
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Introduction 
The link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and company financial 
performance (CP) has gained the attention of academics for a very long time, across 
different disciplines and methods. In their seminal work, Porter and Kramer (2006) 
proposed that the economic objectives of the firm and the objectives of CSR 
initiatives do not need to separate and distinct. Instead of focusing on the “tension 
between business and society,” companies should understand the interdependence 
between the two and anchor CSR initiatives in their company-specific strategies and 
activities.  
Following this framework, Michelon et al. (2013) empirically examined whether CSR 
initiatives have a greater impact on company financial performance if the company 
prioritizes its CSR initiatives and channels resources to these initiatives in a strategic 
way than if it approaches CSR based on generic rationales that all stakeholder 
initiatives are equally preferable and targetable. Their analysis, based on a sample of 
188 best corporate citizens over a three-years period in seven areas of corporate social 
responsibility (namely: environment, community, corporate governance, diversity, 
employee relations, human rights, and product quality), showed that, when a company 
pursues CSR initiatives with the strongest priority and, overall, records better social 
outcome than other companies, the positive effect of its CSR initiatives on CP 
strengthens in terms of both market-based and accounting-based measures of 
performance. The main conclusion of that study is that best corporate citizens benefit 
better performance when they link their CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of 
their most salient stakeholders (prioritization approach to CSR) and undertake the 
corporate social actions that are relevant to the company’s strategy (strategic approach 
to CSR). In other words, whether the firm’s stakeholders have been identified and 
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prioritized in their salience, the firm should link its CSR initiatives to the preferences 
of the most salient or the more relevant groups of stakeholders. 
One limitation of the above study is in the fact that it relies only on best corporate 
performers and the extent to which the same relationship between CSR and CP holds 
for all companies across industries and time is ultimately an empirical question. The 
purpose of this study is to build on the work by Michelon et al. (2013) to provide 
further evidence about the CSR-CP link along the lines of those researchers 
(McWilliam and Siegel, 2001; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2004; Melo and Garrido-
Morgado, 2011) who have argued that only by channeling a firm’s CSR initiatives to 
strategic objectives, directors and top executives can strength the firm’s long-term 
competitiveness and CP.  
In our analysis, the evidence on the positive financial performance effects of 
prioritization and strategic approaches to CSR is much stronger than in the previous 
exploratory attempt (Michelon et al., 2013). Furthermore, we propose improved 
proxies for capturing prioritization and strategic approaches as well as additional tests 
showing insights on how the strategic approach to CSR-related issues is likely to be 
related to the nature of the business, such as membership to environmentally sensitive 
industries. The evidence further suggests that the positive effects in the CSR-CP 
relationship hold also after the financial crisis (especially for the strategic approach); 
and, finally, show that the variables of interest tend to deploy their stronger effects if 
used as complements and not substitutes, especially when managers deal with internal 
stakeholders such as shareholders (governance) and employees.  
Indeed, managing the CSR initiatives of the firm in terms of doing things better than, 
and differently from competitors, can contribute to competitive success in the same 
way that other aspects of competitive strategy do (Porter and Kramer, 2006). By 
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linking the CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the stakeholders and 
channeling company CSR resources to objectives favored by top management and 
directors, companies can ensure that their corporate capabilities will be particularly 
suited to helping create value for the stakeholder groups whose salient needs they are 
trying to address (Ruf et al., 2001). The implications of our studies are discussed in 
the conclusions of the paper. 
 
Extension of the previous study 
Despite being one of the most highly researched areas in empirical managerial 
studies, the CSR-CP relationship in terms of companies’ social actions toward 
specific stakeholder groups has always faced serious methodological issues.  First, 
stakeholders’ salience is mainly measured trough CEO survey (Mitchell et al., 1997) 
and thus it bears the risk of being highly subjective; second, corporate social 
responsibility is often outlined in long and qualitative sustainability reports (i.e. the 
Global Reporting Initiative guidelines) which need to be content analyzed; third, firm-
level decisions on CSR initiative are rarely taken at a governance level and often 
appear very disconnected and fragmented (Porter and Kramer, 2006); and, fourth, 
corporate social responsibility information are often hand-collected and screened by 
independent bodies (i.e. the KPMG CSR survey) in order to be treated for their 
positive or negative outcome with limited or no comparative analysis across 
corporations. 
According to Porter and Kramer (2006), when companies approach CSR in this way, 
they “discover that CSR can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable 
deed—it can be a source of opportunity, innovation and competitive advantage”. In 
other words, they claim that when managers and directors are able to prioritize their 
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social agendas in order to achieve greater social impact, the effect of CSR on 
corporate financial performances will be positive.  
To gain a better understanding of the nature of the CSR-CP relationship, Michelon et 
al. (2013) examined CSR initiatives in terms of corporate social performance (CSP) 
based on the likely preferences of different stakeholders groups. Michelon et al. 
looked at CSP scores of 188 corporations across three years and proposed two 
proxies: one for capturing the greater emphasis on some areas of CSR than other 
corporations (CSR prioritization) and one for capturing superior relative score in 
some areas of CSR than other corporations (strategic approach to CSR). Michelon et 
al. (2013) provide a new methodological approach to empirically test previous 
research assumptions such as: Welford, Chan and Man (2008) proposal about selected 
CSR actions as tools for improving companies’ scanning skills, processes in a way 
that increases the organizational preparedness for change, turbulence, and crises; 
Searcy, McCartney and Karapetrovic (2008) case study about the role of key 
stakeholders involvement in identifying priorities for CSR actions; Alniacik, Alniacik, 
and Genc (2011) study on the role of positive but segmented CSR information as 
particularly enduring advantage that is difficult to be imitated by competitors; Ditlev-
Simonsen and Midttun (2011) analysis of managers’ preference to pursue prioritized 
CSR mainly for targeting value maximization; and Brammer, Hoejmose and 
Marchant (2012) tests about the fewer benefits perceived by the smallest and less 
strategic companies engaged with environmental issues.   
Despite their limitations, the two proxies proposed by Michelon et al. (2013), 
measured together, allow to capture what is at the core of strategically prioritized 
CSR activities and the preliminary results provided support for the assertion that CSR 
initiatives focused on few CSR areas (prioritization) and able to outperform other 
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corporations’ CSP (strategic) are positively associated with CP. However, these 
relationships were not observed for all of the seven areas of CSR. Tests for 
interactions between strategically prioritized CSR and the CSR-CP relationship found 
no interaction effect between CP and environment-related or employee-related CSR 
initiatives. Moreover, the sample used was biased towards the best performers, as it 
included only companies belonging to the Top 100 Best Corporate Citizens. So the 
extent to which results would hold for other types of companies is not clear. Using 
variance and top tiers between companies’ CSP as proxies for prioritization and 
strategic approaches to CSR (Michelon et al., 2013; Wang and Choi, 2010) forces 
researchers to enlarge datasets as much as possible in order to better investigate the 
reliability and robustness of the research variables. Because of the limited size and 
bias towards best performers of the sample used in Michelon et al. (2013), it remains 
undetermined whether their results would have held for a larger cross-section of 
companies operating in different industries with different structural characteristics and 
facing different competitive external challenges.  
The following sections of this paper will further investigate the reliability of the 
proxies proposed by Michelon et al. (2013) in a larger sample, over 5 times more 
companies (from 188 to over 900); for a larger number of years (from 3 to 9 years); 
across different industries (environmentally sensitive industries vs. others); taking 
into consideration different competitive challenges (before and after the financial 
crisis of 2007); and introducing stronger lagged effects and control variables in 
modeling the relationship between CSP and CP. The ultimate goal is to propose to the 
academic community further evidence about the validity of investigating the variance 
and top tiers in CSR as valuable proxies of specific firm-level decision such as the 
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relevance of prioritized corporate social actions and the possibility to build a 
competitive advantage based on selected corporate social actions.   
Research Method 
Sample selection  
We base our analysis on a sample of US firms over the period 2003-2011. We retrieve 
CSR data from the KLD database while we compute corporate performance data from 
Compustat. Although we start from are more than 20,000 observations resulting from 
the merge of Compustat and KLD, we lose 2,861 firm-years’ observations where 
there is missing data for computing the full set of corporate performance measures 
and the control variables. Furthermore, in order to ensure that our results are not 
driven by changes in the coverage of firms by KLD, we restrict our analysis to a 
balanced panel of firms that are covered each year of the period considered. We end 
up with 8,910 firm-year observations, for 990 unique firms over the period 2003-2011 
which are simultaneously covered by both datasets along the nine years considered in 
the study.  
Measures of corporate performance (CP) 
Following Michelon et al. (2013), we measure company’s performance in 
terms of short-term accounting-based measures, long-term accounting-based 
measures, and market-based measures. For accounting-based measures, we consider 
EBITDA, Capital Expenditure, and Intangibles. For the market-based measure, we 
select companies’ market value at the end of each of fiscal year. We use both 
concurrent and leading performance data in our main analyses.  
Measurement of Corporate Social Performance (CSP)  
The independent variables used in this study are the seven areas of stakeholder 
management on which KLD rates company’s CSR initiatives: environment, 
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community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, human rights, and 
product quality and safety. As KLD ratings indicate the presence of strengths and 
weaknesses in each of the seven areas of CSR (Mattingly and Berman, 2006), a low 
rating is indicative of weakness or the absence of strength, while a high rating 
indicates the presence of positive activity toward a stakeholder group and the absence 
of weaknesses.   
Measures of strategically prioritized CSR activities 
While we follow Michelon et al. (2013) in their spirit of measuring 
strategically prioritized CSR activities, we do bring an important innovation, in that 
we calibrate our measures on the industry to which each company belongs. Indeed, a 
company that prioritizes its CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the 
stakeholders (captured by greater emphasis on some areas of CSR than others) and 
then uses CSR resources strategically to pursue those CSR objectives (reflected by 
superior relative score in some areas of CSR than others), will most likely do so 
benchmarking itself with the industry peers. Thus, given that we have great variability 
across industries which was very limited in Michelon et al. (2013) setting of the 100 
best corporate citizens, we consider prioritization of stakeholders as well as the 
strategic approach to CSR as driven by the type of industry in which the firm is 
operating. 
We follow Michelon et al. (2013) and we measure the extent to which a 
company prioritizes its CSR initiatives by considering the variance in each company’s 
CSR rating related to the seven areas in each of the 9 years. We create a dummy 
variable for “priority” equal to 1 if the variance of each firm is greater than the 
industry (defined following the two-digits SIC codes) average variance in each year 
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and 0 otherwise. This measure aims at capturing whether CSR initiatives are 
selectively linked to its stakeholders’ preferences.  
 Next, to measure whether a company adopts a strategic approach to CSR in 
each of the areas covered by the KLD dataset, we consider the mean score for each of 
the seven areas of CSR for all the companies within each industry (defined following 
the two-digits SIC codes) in each year. If a company’s score is higher than the overall 
mean for a given year/industry for a specific area of CSR, we classify the company as 
addressing the demands of that stakeholder group in a strategic way. Accordingly, a 
dummy variable “strategic” is created, and companies are given a value equal to 1 if a 
company’s score is higher than the overall industry-year mean and 0 otherwise. Seven 
dummy variables, one for each area of CSR, are created in this way.   
 Although these measure still suffer from limitation, we argue that they do 
capture the core of strategically prioritized CSR activities and are aligned with 
approaches previously used (Wang and Choi, 2010). Table 1 provides a summary of 
variables definitions. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Modeling the Effect of Strategically Prioritized CSR  
Following Michelon et al. (2013), we run the following models with year and 
industry fixed effects and panel-corrected standard errors assuming within-unit 
homoscedasticity:  
(1)  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  !" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" +𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠!" +𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
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We also take care of the simultaneity in the CSR-CP relationship by 
considering a lagged effect, in which strategically prioritized CSR measures at time t 
are regressed on company performance during time t+1, as follows: 
(2) 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  !(!!!) = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!" +𝛽!𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠!" +𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
 
We include size as control variables based on the recommendations and 
findings of previous researchers (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Coombs and Gilley, 
2005; Choi and Wang, 2009). We measure firm size by the natural logarithm of the 
sales. Our models also take into consideration industry and year fixed effects. 
Next, in order to examine the effect of strategically prioritized CSR activities 
on CP, we use moderated multiple regressions, run with year and industry fixed 
effects and panel corrected standard errors. We specified the following models to test 
this relationship: 
(3) 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  !" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐!" +𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅!" ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
(4) 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  ! !!! =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅!" +𝛽!𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐!"   + 𝛽!𝐶𝑆𝑅!" ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐!" + 𝛽!𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!" 
 
Where i,t indicate, respectively, firm and year observations; company performance is 
measured by EBITDA, market value, capital expenditure, and intangible assets; 
priority is a dummy variable that indicates whether the CSR initiatives of the 
company are linked to stakeholder preferences; CSR is the KLD ratings in the areas of 
community, governance, diversity, employees, environment, human rights, and 
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product; Strategic is a dummy variable that indicates whether the company channeled 
its CSR resources to CSR initiatives in a strategic way in the seven areas of CSR; size 
is a logarithmic transformation of sales. 
Results 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables included 
in the study. The characteristics associated with the companies included in the sample 
are reported in terms of the average EBITDA, market value, capital expenditures and 
intangible assets. Also included in Table 2 are the CSR performance ratings of 
companies in the sample. On average, companies perform better with issues involving 
diversity (mean=0.27), community relations (mean=0.08), and environment 
(mean=0.04) than they do on issues related to human rights (mean=-0.06), product 
responsibility (mean=-0.20), employee relations (mean=-0.20) and governance 
(mean=-0.39). As expected, these average rankings are much lower than in Michelon 
et al.  (2013), since their sample was restricted to the best performers. Nevertheless, 
similarly to their evidence, the standard deviation associated with each rating 
indicates a fair degree of variation among companies in their corporate social actions; 
ratings on diversity, employee relations and environmental issues show the largest 
variance, while human rights and community ratings have the lowest variance.   
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Table 3 presents the results of the main effect models (equation 1 and 2), in 
which both concurrent and future CP (measured in terms of EBITDA, capital 
expenditure, company market value, and intangibles) is regressed on the seven areas 
of CSR while controlling for company size, industry and year fixed effects in order to 
determine the nature of the CSR-CP relationship. Results provide mixed evidence 
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about the relationship between CSR and concurrent CP. While community and 
diversity-related CSR initiatives are positively and significantly associated with all of 
the four performance measures, we get the opposite evidence for human rights and the 
product-related CSR activities, which are significantly and negatively associated to 
the CP measures. Governance is significantly and positively associated with both 
EBITDA and capital expenditure (concurrent and future), environment is also 
associated with these two measures of CP but negatively. Finally employee related 
CSR activities are positive related only to two of our CP measures (EBITDA and 
market value). The CSR-CP relationship is stronger (as is evident in the variance 
explained) in terms of the financial performance measures—EBITDA (r 
square=0.475), market value (r square=0.443) and capital expenditure (r 
square=0.399) than in terms of the intangibles (r square=0.303).  
We get consistent results if we consider the relationship between the various 
areas and future CP: all coefficients are significant and have the same sign, except for 
community performance and future capital expenditure, for which the coefficient 
becomes insignificant. On the overall, this mixed evidence is consistent to the 
findings of Michelon et al. (2013), Chiu and Sharfman, (2009) and Orlitzky et al., 
2003). 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Following Michelon et al. (2013), in order to investigate the effects of CSR 
initiatives that are prioritized via strategic concerns on the CSR-CP relationship, we 
run seven moderated multiple regressions, one for each of the specific areas of CSR 
initiatives (equation 3). The effect of each variable is analyzed after controlling for 
size, industry and year fixed effects. The model considers the main effect of each 
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CSR areas as well as the interaction term examining the moderating effect of the 
strategic approach adopted in each of the seven areas of CSR across the four 
performance measures. Results are presented in Table 4. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
 The coefficient for Priority, which measures the attempt of firms to link the 
firm's CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the stakeholders, is positively 
associated with concurrent CP in each of the areas of CSR initiatives, except 
diversity.  In terms of the various measures of CP that we use, prioritization appears 
to play a role in the CSR-CP relationships more in terms of EBITDA, market value 
and intangibles than in terms of capital expenditure. While the results obtained for 
EBITDA and market value are very well aligned with those of Michelon et al. (2013), 
they find an effect of prioritization in the relationship between CSR and capital 
expenditure, which is more rare in our setting. Nevertheless, the evidence still 
supports the assertion that CSR initiatives based on prioritization of stakeholders are 
positively associated with CP. 
In terms of the moderating effect of a strategic approach in the various CSR 
areas on the CSR-CP relationship we find that twenty-five of the 28 potential 
interaction effects (seven area of CSR across four corporate performance measures) 
are significant and in the predicted direction (positive effect).  
A strategic approach to CSR initiative positively moderates the CSR-CP 
relationship in terms of all the seven CSR areas, when corporate performance is 
measured in terms of EBITDA or capital expenditure. The moderating effect cannot 
be traced in one area (environment) when corporate performance is measured in terms 
of company's market value and in two areas (community and environment) when CP 
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is measures as intangibles. The evidence on the moderating effects is much stronger 
than in Michelon et al. (2013) although they still require further explanation and 
discussion. 
In seventeen cases, twelve of which were statistically significant, the CSR 
main effect is negative and the interaction effect is positive. For example, human 
rights and product-related CSR actions are - by themselves - negatively related to all 
of the CP measures considered, but the interaction terms are positive. Similarly, 
governance-related CSR is negatively related to company value, but the interaction 
term is significant and positive. While this evidence was also present in Michelon et 
al. (2013), the results obtained in this study provide stronger and further support to the 
fact that, while CSR initiatives in certain areas may have a negative effect on CP 
(presumably in terms of the cost incurred and the benefits derived), when the 
company's CSR resources are used in a strategic manner to pursue social objectives 
that are favored by the company's stakeholders, performance is likely to improve. 
Results obtained considering future CP (equation 4) provide qualitatively the 
same evidence (Table 5), although the association between prioritization of 
stakeholders’ needs and CP is less noticeable as seven coefficients (out of twenty) 
become insignificant.  On the other side, the moderating effects of the strategic 
allocation of CSR resource hold very well and support the idea that stakeholders 
relationship have a persistent effect on company performance (Choi and Wang, 2009).  
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------ 
Additional tests 
 
We perform three additional tests aimed at providing further insights into the 
CSR-CP relationship.  
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The first test aims at providing an insight into the so called environmentally 
sensitive industries, where exposure to public pressure for the safeguard of the 
environment is particularly high, because of the concerns of the general public, 
political bodies as well as regulatory agency (Cho and Patten, 2007). Following Cho 
and Patten (2007), we separated firms that operate primarily in environmentally 
sensitive industries (ESI) from those that do not (non-ESI). ESI firms are defined as 
companies with a two-digits SIC code equal to:  13 (oil exploration), 26 (paper), 28 
(chemical and allied products), 29 (petroleum refining), 33 (metals), 10 (mining) or 
49 (utilities). We expect that a strategically prioritized approach to the environment 
will have a greater effect for ESI than non-ESI firms. We thus run equation 3 
separately for ESI and non-ESI firms. Results are reported in Table 6. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------ 
  
The coefficient for Priority, which measures the attempt of firms to link the 
firm's CSR initiatives to the likely preferences of the stakeholders, is positively 
associated with EBITDA and market value for both ESI and non-ESI firms. 
Nevertheless, the coefficients of priority for ESI firms present a greater magnitude 
than for non-ESI. When performance is measured as EBITDA, the main effect 
(environment) is negative and significant for ESI firms, while it is still negative but 
not significant for non-ESI firms. When performance is measured as capital 
expenditure, we find a significant and negative coefficient for the main effect 
(environment) and a significant and positive coefficient for the moderating effect 
(environment*strategic) for both ESI and non-ESI firms, but for ESI firms the 
coefficients are much greater in absolute value. This evidence points towards the fact 
that the process of prioritization and strategic approach in relation to environmental-
 16 
related CSR activities strengthen the CSR-CP relationship more in ESI than non-ESI 
firms. 
In the second analysis, we look at whether the relationship between 
strategically prioritized CSR activities and CP was affected by the financial crisis that 
started in 2007 with the liquidity shortfall of the banking system. During the financial 
downturn, stock indexes fell, various financial institutions collapsed, unemployment 
grew. Under these circumstances, companies might either restrict their investment on 
CSR as it generates costs (Orlitzky et al. 2003) or else use CSR to foster further their 
CP. Therefore it is unclear whether our evidence is somewhat biased by the 
happening of the financial crisis that has raised concerns over the role of businesses in 
the society, the corporate governance models of firms, the welfare of thousands of 
employees as well as undermined customer trust in well respected brands. For this 
reasons, we run equation 3 separately in the pre-crisis period (2003-2006) and in the 
post-crisis period (2007-2011) for four of the seven CSR areas: community, 
governance, employee and product, which we believe were the most affected by the 
unfolding of the crisis. Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
While running the regression separately for the pre and post crisis period does 
not qualitatively lead us to falsify our previous results, we do still notice that the 
effect of prioritization on CP is generally attenuated in the post crisis period (eight of 
the sixteen coefficients are not significant, although positive). On the other side, the 
moderating effect of a strategic use of CSR resources seems to hold well also after the 
crisis: only three of the sixteen interaction coefficients are not significant. This 
analysis suggests that despite the negative forces played by the financial crisis over 
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corporate performance, a strategically prioritized approach to CSR seems to 
strengthen the CSR-CP relationship. 
In our third test we acknowledge that prioritization and a strategic approach to 
CSR are not independent strategies, and that they can either work as complements or 
substitutes. Therefore we run the model descripted by equation 3 separately for those 
companies that prioritize vs. those that do not, for three CSR areas: community, 
governance and employee, where prioritization was found to have a strong effect on 
CP.  Table 8 presents the results. For companies that do not prioritize, the main effect 
of the CSR area is significant in seven cases out twelve, but despite its significant, it 
is always negative, suggesting that for companies that do not prioritize between 
stakeholders need, the CSR-CP relationship is not present, or worse negative. In all 
cases where the main effect is significant and negative, the moderating effect is also 
significant and positive, suggesting that a strategic use of CSR resources can 
counterbalance the negative effect of non-prioritizing among stakeholders’ 
preferences. For companies that do prioritize, the evidence is not straightforward. In 
the case of community-related CSR activities, the main effect is positive and 
significant for EBITDA, market value and intangibles, but there is no support for a 
significant interaction effect. We interpret this evidence as a signal that a strategic 
approach to community related CSR activities is a substitute, or at least, not a 
complement to prioritization of stakeholders’ preference in affecting the CSR-CP 
relationship. Nevertheless we find that the opposite is true when we consider 
governance and employee-related CSR activities. Here the moderating effect is 
positive and significant in six out of eight cases, suggesting that the strategic use of 
CSR resources is adopted together with prioritization of stakeholders’ preference to 
affect the CSR-CP relationship.  
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------------------------------ 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Discussion & Conclusion 
To gain a better understanding of the nature of the CSR-CP relationship, this 
study examined CSR initiatives in terms of strategic choices that companies make and 
pursue based on the assumption, well supported in literature, that stakeholders are not 
all equally important in a specific time-framework or industry and strategic settings. 
Accordingly, managers interested in optimizing their CSR initiatives, in term of 
overall contribution of CSR to CP, are called to design their CSR initiative according 
to the most relevant and salient stakeholder preferences. 
In our results the evidence on the positive effects of prioritization and strategic 
approaches to CSR is much stronger than in the previous exploratory attempt 
(Michelon et al., 2013). This result was not obvious, considering the sensible increase 
in the number of companies tested and in the number of years observed, as well as the 
extension beyond best CSR performers.  
Furthermore, the improved proxies tested in this research note for capturing 
prioritization and strategic approaches as well as our additional tests show insights on 
how the strategic approach to CSR-related issues are likely to be related to the nature 
of the business, such as membership to environmentally sensitive industries. 
Moreover we provide evidence of positive effects in the CSR-CP relationship also 
after the financial crisis (especially for the strategic approach); and, finally, we show 
that our variables of interest tend to deploy their stronger effects if used as 
complements and not substitutes, especially when managers deal with internal 
stakeholders such as shareholder (governance) and employees. In this last scenario, 
companies report better financial performance if, having focused on initiative related 
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to those internal stakeholders, deploy CSR resources targeting better CSP then 
competitors.  
It seems proved under several different circumstances, thus, that social 
benefits often reinforce and overlap with the corporate competitive advantage. No 
matter what type of the seven CSP one analyzes, data show there is always at least 
one company whose business model is able to capitalize on the link between better 
social performances and strengthened financials.  
Given these results, we believe the proposed proxies represent a parsimonious 
way to observe the outcome of important strategic decisions managers are called to 
make about how to approach CSR in a timely and effective manner. The results 
indicate that companies whose CSR activities are prioritized have superior financial 
performance and that the process of prioritization together with the strategic approach 
adopted by the firm strengthens the CSR-CP relationship.  
The fact that the coefficients of the seven CSP areas themselves were often 
negatively when associated to CP, while the interaction effect with the strategic proxy 
was positive, suggests that, in the absence of strategic approaches, participating in 
social issues in general and not strategic terms leads to diminished financial 
outcomes. Accordingly, when implementing CSR initiatives, managers will see the 
largest impact (in term of both CSP and CP) if they channel their CSR resources in 
terms of strategic objectives related to the most salient stakeholder needs.  
The evidence provided in this study has important implications for both 
managers and regulators. For managers, the findings suggest that, even though social 
investments made in any stakeholder domain may temporally pay in form of 
improved visibility, only prioritized and strategic oriented social investments are 
likely to impact on financial performance. On the opposite side, companies that 
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ignore CSR initiatives aimed toward those stakeholder groups which are 
progressively becoming more relevant for the success of their business model may be 
penalized in the form of poor performance. Any social investment and initiative 
should thus be the outcome of accurate strategic planning in order to move from 
venture philanthropy to the generation of shared value between key stakeholders and 
shareholders. For regulators, this research stresses the difficulties in proposing broad 
and comprehensive multi-stakeholder disclosure policies. Successful companies 
leverage on the flexibility of their decision-making and target a stakeholder 
management, which varies over time, industries and companies’ size. Any social or 
sustainability guideline should thus empathize an up-front screening of the most 
relevant stakeholder relationships and encourage managers to highlight and share with 
external audiences which aspects of their business model, in any specific given time, 
can be source of both: social value for all stakeholders and financial value for 
markets, tax authorities, employees, suppliers and other primary stakeholders. Social 
guidelines will better fit companies and communities needs if and when they require 
broad stakeholder reporting together with selected CSR investments plans and 
prioritized CSR agendas.        
While this study reinforced the hypothesis that a strategic path to CSR is 
visible in the most known and studied CSP data (the KLD dataset, investigated in its 
largest version), the topic warrants additional investigation. First, future research 
could further disentangle what the proxies of prioritization and strategic approaches 
capture. Second, specific studies should move beyond correlating broad measures of a 
company’s CSR initiatives with CP by examining direct measures of firm-level 
corporate social actions in order to better clarify the CSR decision-making process 
able to benefit both society and business.  
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Table 1. Variables definitions 
 
 Name Measure 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
MKT VALUE Market Value of the company 
CAP EXP Capital Expenditure 
INTANG Intangible Assets 
Community KLD net score for Community 
Governance KLD net score for Governance 
Diversity KLD net score for Diversity 
Employee KLD net score for Employee 
Environment KLD net score for Environment 
Human Rights KLD net score for Human Rights 
Product KLD net score for Product 
Strategic CSR 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if a company’s score in a given KLD 
(CSR) are is higher than the overall industry-year mean and 0 
otherwise. Seven dummy variables, one for each area of CSR, are 
created in this way. 
Priority 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the variance of each firm is greater than 
the industry (defined following the two-digits SIC codes) average 
variance in each year and 0 otherwise. 
Size Ln(sales) 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis 
 
  Mean Std dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1.EBITDA 1,007.57 3,167.46 1                       
2. MKT 
VALUE 7,764.41 22,961.16 0.874*** 1                     
3. CAP EXP 365.56 1,256.91 0.827*** 0.626*** 1                   
4. INTANG 1,477.16 5,925.18 0.731*** 0.659*** 0.505*** 1                 
5. Community 0.08 0.56 0.216*** 0.254*** 0.095*** 0.217*** 1               
6. Governance -0.39 0.76 -0.058*** -0.073*** -0.062*** -0.056*** 0.088*** 1             
7. Diversity 0.27 1.48 0.413*** 0.433*** 0.285*** 0.352*** 0.318*** 0.012 1           
8. Employee -0.20 0.93 0.071*** 0.124*** 0.001 0.030** 0.125*** 0.025* 0.115*** 1         
9. Environment 0.04 0.94 0.004 0.064*** -0.103*** 0.090*** 0.353*** 0.124*** 0.182*** 0.098*** 1       
10. Human 
Rights -0.06 0.29 -0.323*** -0.299*** -0.297*** -0.164*** 0.006 0.082*** -0.130*** 0.051*** 0.133*** 1     
11.Product -0.20 0.65 -0.289*** -0.299*** -0.222*** -0.236*** -0.017 0.104*** -0.181*** 0.083*** 0.117*** 0.158*** 1   
12. Priority 0.31 0.46 0.159*** 0.177*** 0.120*** 0.126*** 0.116*** -0.144*** 0.122*** -0.070*** 0.067*** -0.103*** -0.156*** 1 
13. Size 7.42 1.61 0.512*** 0.493*** 0.434*** 0.382*** 0.187*** -0.199*** 0.433*** -0.025* 0.031** -0.227*** -0.322*** 0.222*** 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 3. CSR initiatives and CP 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
VARIABLES EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt EBITDAt+1 MKT VALUE t+1 CAP EXP t+1 INTANG t+1 
                  
Community 481.921*** 3,986.648*** 78.541** 805.602*** 504.667*** 3,875.969*** 47.858 780.636*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.048] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.261] [0.001] 
Governance 204.673*** 601.208 62.354*** 145.962 129.958** 360.524 40.280** 61.644 
 
[0.000] [0.152] [0.001] [0.125] [0.011] [0.422] [0.029] [0.542] 
Diversity 466.273*** 3,211.933*** 140.094*** 727.820*** 483.225*** 3,247.613*** 141.944*** 777.113*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Employee 142.205*** 2,272.528*** -7.744 -32.556 154.626*** 2,189.951*** 4.695 46.545 
 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.699] [0.750] [0.002] [0.000] [0.823] [0.667] 
Environment -115.636** 130.899 -105.714*** 104.353 -117.169** 368.581 -115.929*** 133.100 
 
[0.012] [0.690] [0.000] [0.257] [0.020] [0.308] [0.000] [0.204] 
Human Rights -2,073.865*** -13,923.118*** -710.545*** -1,602.360*** -2,236.058*** -14,632.887*** -763.922*** -1,587.977*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Product  -591.080*** -5,029.768*** -143.098*** -959.794*** -635.499*** -4,876.476*** -164.242*** -973.500*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Size 626.524*** 4,625.419*** 205.695*** 1,031.906*** 620.335*** 4,590.620*** 203.069*** 1,076.443*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant -5,378.257*** -34,025.235*** -1,872.539*** -7,767.189*** -5,459.025*** -33,106.608*** -1,921.274*** -8,075.523*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         Observations 8,910 8,910 8,910 8,910 7920 7,920 7,920 7,920 
R-squared 0.475 0.443 0.399 0.303 0.481 0.444 0.406 0.302 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 4. Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and CP 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
 
        
Priority 127.353** 2,036.177*** 4.967 259.907** 
 
[0.032] [0.000] [0.851] [0.034] 
Community -144.331 1,135.785 -307.513*** 815.981*** 
 
[0.432] [0.263] [0.001] [0.001] 
Strategic -20.174 552.370 -131.473*** 44.747 
 
[0.861] [0.486] [0.004] [0.856] 
Community*Strategic 1,194.443*** 6,375.813*** 652.280*** 565.547 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.156] 
     Priority 251.236*** 2,747.206*** 50.201* 409.973*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.054] [0.002] 
Governance -213.902 -1,965.588* -68.547 -147.333 
 
[0.171] [0.088] [0.268] [0.546] 
Strategic 420.515*** 2,758.014** 91.759 518.408** 
 
[0.007] [0.014] [0.149] [0.033] 
Governance*Strategic 863.155*** 6,295.607*** 247.019*** 713.675** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.015] 
     Priority -71.114 404.826 -29.517 -207.182 
 
[0.277] [0.348] [0.340] [0.110] 
Diversity 134.537** 366.624 30.739 172.561 
 
[0.011] [0.318] [0.183] [0.104] 
Strategic -774.007*** -4,679.340*** -204.288*** -1,484.532*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Diversity*Strategic 839.567*** 6,775.525*** 219.580*** 1,477.020*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
     Priority 229.881*** 2,613.178*** 42.240 280.649** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.136] [0.046] 
Employee -34.176 1,099.328* -88.043* -511.632** 
 
[0.749] [0.076] [0.093] [0.033] 
Strategic 207.497** 461.314 103.618** 666.735*** 
 
[0.049] [0.475] [0.037] [0.003] 
Employee*Strategic 433.253*** 4,013.088*** 128.903** 949.806*** 
  [0.001] [0.000] [0.028] [0.001] 
     Priority 235.165*** 2,741.318*** 58.618** 349.250*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.023] [0.005] 
Environment -137.393 1,175.637** -178.321*** 656.040*** 
 
[0.111] [0.021] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic -150.756* -750.666 -0.607 -483.699*** 
 
[0.064] [0.232] [0.985] [0.007] 
Environment*Strategic 422.619*** 769.540 184.069*** -174.013 
  [0.000] [0.281] [0.000] [0.374] 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 4 (continued). Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and CP 
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
Priority 149.770** 2,177.492*** 20.520 286.187** 
 
[0.016] [0.000] [0.437] [0.025] 
Human Rights -2,679.911*** -16,976.530*** -954.970*** -2,168.280*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic 104.908 -179.145 79.128 -92.619 
 
[0.388] [0.819] [0.144] [0.606] 
HumanR*Strategic 4,171.208*** 27,348.807*** 1,227.556*** 4,974.205*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] 
     Priority 136.241** 2,015.935*** 23.541 254.638* 
 
[0.031] [0.000] [0.375] [0.075] 
Product -1,065.994*** -8,652.450*** -296.662*** -1,244.585*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic 369.364*** 3,891.154*** 103.217** 326.192 
 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.010] [0.153] 
Product*Strategic 1,230.345*** 9,008.102*** 305.705*** 720.025* 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.068] 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 5. Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and future CP 
 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  EBITDAt+1 MKT VALUE t+1 CAP EXP t+1 INTANG t+1 
 
        
Priority 98.747 1,651.370*** -4.123 183.415 
 
[0.133] [0.000] [0.889] [0.182] 
Community -278.049 493.822 -413.444*** 759.320*** 
 
[0.158] [0.648] [0.000] [0.004] 
Strategic -34.111 967.972 -117.971** 154.779 
 
[0.781] [0.247] [0.017] [0.550] 
Community*Strategic 1,471.602*** 7,253.845*** 772.619*** 615.575 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.159] 
     Priority 220.200*** 2,231.931*** 43.542 299.404* 
 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.137] [0.051] 
Governance -293.713* -2,652.355** -74.815 -258.318 
 
[0.087] [0.031] [0.270] [0.343] 
Strategic 375.199** 2,786.130** 67.207 443.006* 
 
[0.029] [0.020] [0.337] [0.099] 
Governance*Strategic 961.616*** 7,377.647*** 259.612*** 750.177** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] 
     Priority -73.887 155.805 -25.853 -296.792** 
 
[0.299] [0.732] [0.442] [0.037] 
Diversity 126.642** 380.164 37.080 93.709 
 
[0.026] [0.327] [0.138] [0.411] 
Strategic -864.498*** -5,504.607*** -231.051*** -1,652.258*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Diversity*Strategic 909.956*** 7,085.289*** 222.596*** 1,706.506*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
     Priority 222.604*** 2,287.965*** 38.804 177.399 
 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.224] [0.267] 
Employee -50.369 1,028.643 -87.739 -530.055** 
 
[0.679] [0.139] [0.146] [0.049] 
Strategic 264.285** 540.313 116.408* 744.229*** 
 
[0.037] [0.474] [0.057] [0.006] 
Employee*Strategic 456.889*** 3,986.484*** 141.808** 1,119.760*** 
  [0.003] [0.000] [0.040] [0.001] 
     Priority 221.599*** 2,326.597*** 54.993* 269.614* 
 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.056] [0.054] 
Environment -160.141* 981.077* -209.409*** 784.832*** 
 
[0.084] [0.072] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic -128.686 -461.030 4.974 -610.159*** 
 
[0.166] [0.505] [0.892] [0.002] 
Environment*Strategic 438.890*** 1,163.180 209.979*** -318.807 
  [0.000] [0.138] [0.000] [0.157] 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 5 (continued). Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and future CP  
     
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  EBITDAt+1 MKT VALUE t+1 CAP EXP t+1 INTANG t+1 
Priority 127.415* 1,729.479*** 14.693 203.323 
 
[0.063] [0.000] [0.616] [0.157] 
Human Rights -2,823.959*** -17,340.326*** -1,025.207*** -1,900.163*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic 212.925 233.378 138.098* -196.185 
 
[0.189] [0.807] [0.062] [0.381] 
Human Rights*Strategic 4,018.094*** 27,957.610*** 1,222.180*** 3,934.387 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.106] 
     Priority 96.777 1,521.806*** 16.251 131.258 
 
[0.169] [0.002] [0.585] [0.418] 
Product -1,189.013*** -9,194.697*** -316.873*** -1,473.999*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Strategic 470.216*** 4,932.485*** 118.587** 565.140* 
 
[0.001] [0.000] [0.022] [0.054] 
Product*Strategic 1,330.221*** 9,672.245*** 255.760*** 1,053.171** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.015] 
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01  
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Table 6. Strategically prioritized environmental initiatives and CP in ESI vs. non-ESI firms 
 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
VARIABLES ESI non ESI ESI non ESI ESI non ESI ESI non ESI 
                  
Priority 540.027*** 136.963** 5,274.267*** 1,994.360*** 63.669 44.026* 1,162.397*** 107.438 
 
[0.001] [0.025] [0.000] [0.000] [0.420] [0.056] [0.001] [0.385] 
Environment -494.591*** -117.651 896.700 484.744 -421.398*** -138.719*** 505.554* 487.663** 
 
[0.004] [0.350] [0.348] [0.554] [0.000] [0.003] [0.052] [0.022] 
Strategic 799.441*** -352.337*** 1,916.978 -1,485.975** 594.734*** -104.370*** 340.849 -704.147*** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.190] [0.041] [0.000] [0.003] [0.467] [0.000] 
Environment*Strategic 620.369*** 471.843*** 437.207 1,819.947* 279.394*** 193.510*** -143.940 76.321 
 
[0.002] [0.001] [0.760] [0.070] [0.001] [0.000] [0.770] [0.766] 
        
Size YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
        
         Observations 1,953 6,957 1,953 6,957 1,953 6,957 1,953 6,957 
R-squared 0.416 0.365 0.371 0.335 0.383 0.305 0.177 0.304 
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Table 7. Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and CP in the pre vs. post crisis period  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
VARIABLES 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 
Priority 177.201*** 105.711 2,292.201*** 1,935.488*** 51.616* -33.955 231.860* 312.411 
 
[0.006] [0.266] [0.000] [0.001] [0.060] [0.421] [0.068] [0.117] 
Community -260.634 -47.096 707.141 935.139 -327.552** -331.301** 319.036 1,222.471*** 
 
[0.310] [0.863] [0.663] [0.511] [0.010] [0.018] [0.458] [0.000] 
Strategic 142.309 -143.192 3,404.648** -517.670 -36.707 -81.120 131.122 -146.056 
 
[0.421] [0.428] [0.025] [0.634] [0.601] [0.220] [0.668] [0.746] 
Community*Strategic 1,367.595*** 1,034.659*** 8,179.783*** 5,446.470*** 638.057*** 630.463*** 1,119.966** 55.715 
  [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.030] [0.927] 
Priority 212.940** 293.120*** 2,951.761*** 2,550.543*** 89.225*** 6.403 313.620** 472.414** 
 
[0.033] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.874] [0.030] [0.032] 
Governance -165.087 -432.549 -4,536.377* -1,038.675 -155.953 -71.845 -740.352 149.350 
 
[0.390] [0.129] [0.070] [0.430] [0.160] [0.373] [0.114] [0.589] 
Strategic 453.007** 428.337 3,626.297 2,797.924* 130.029 116.393 602.570 341.168 
 
[0.032] [0.101] [0.108] [0.050] [0.203] [0.209] [0.157] [0.289] 
Governance*Strategic 788.467*** 929.338*** 8,484.828*** 5,539.649*** 288.089*** 243.143*** 1,148.894** 219.922 
  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.008] [0.005] [0.017] [0.584] 
Priority 295.168*** 215.215** 3,133.225*** 2,436.272*** 97.522*** 1.245 291.062** 339.492 
 
[0.000] [0.030] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.977] [0.039] [0.144] 
Employee 14.107 12.742 1,691.496 1,133.489 -43.667 -105.914 -397.955 -391.792 
 
[0.933] [0.930] [0.223] [0.122] [0.619] [0.116] [0.169] [0.276] 
Strategic 214.673 141.049 472.975 9.586 97.474 108.611* 646.477* 508.960 
 
[0.277] [0.281] [0.772] [0.990] [0.323] [0.065] [0.056] [0.109] 
Employee*Strategic 434.498* 355.957** 3,837.006* 3,717.710*** 104.807 126.111* 960.773** 745.381* 
  [0.083] [0.034] [0.056] [0.001] [0.334] [0.076] [0.023] [0.064] !
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Table 7 (continued). Strategically prioritized CSR initiatives and CP in the pre vs. post crisis period  
 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
VARIABLES 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 2003-2006 2007-2011 
 
        
Priority 160.724** 123.791 2,060.675*** 1,991.962*** 60.910** -12.703 138.584 351.940 
 
[0.025] [0.206] [0.001] [0.002] [0.031] [0.747] [0.355] [0.131] 
Product -1,122.421*** -1,156.032*** -10,262.409*** -8,642.471*** -351.862*** -331.468*** -1,732.164*** -1,002.625** 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.033] 
Strategic 451.512** 540.177*** 5,242.429** 4,988.951*** 175.241** 171.472** 655.826 366.802 
 
[0.041] [0.002] [0.012] [0.000] [0.050] [0.011] [0.150] [0.314] 
Product*Strategic 1,337.657*** 1,157.847*** 10,954.112*** 7,823.269*** 271.372*** 328.683*** 1,835.897*** -174.578 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.756] 
         Size YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 
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Table 8. Strategically CSR initiatives and CP for prioritizing vs. non-prioritizing firms 
 
  EBITDAt MKT VALUEt CAP EXPt INTANGt 
VARIABLES Priority Non Priority Priority Non Priority Priority Non Priority Priority Non Priority 
                  
Community 769.358*** -768.531*** 7,132.887*** -2,765.448** -25.304 -445.481*** 2,024.053*** 238.446 
 
[0.010] [0.001] [0.000] [0.017] [0.863] [0.000] [0.000] [0.189] 
Strategic -257.925 201.552** 48.396 1,235.624** -269.995*** -56.614 -473.034 354.024** 
 
[0.245] [0.025] [0.977] [0.026] [0.001] [0.233] [0.370] [0.033] 
Community*Strategic 252.359 1,369.881*** -683.860 6,886.916*** 340.319** 856.135*** -834.440 450.850 
  [0.467] [0.000] [0.770] [0.000] [0.035] [0.000] [0.245] [0.155] 
Governance -121.915 -271.894* -168.583 -3,231.466*** -76.440 -1.106 244.466 -610.109** 
 
[0.623] [0.077] [0.928] [0.001] [0.475] [0.979] [0.537] [0.032] 
Strategic 369.449 264.657* 47.602 2,682.333*** 108.605 -17.023 293.573 513.442** 
 
[0.216] [0.056] [0.983] [0.003] [0.399] [0.698] [0.571] [0.039] 
Governance*Strategic 993.669*** 595.711*** 6,677.533** 4,695.395*** 275.164** 142.152*** 43.375 921.149*** 
  [0.002] [0.000] [0.016] [0.000] [0.026] [0.003] [0.943] [0.003] 
Employee 153.862 -269.749 2,568.925*** -1,098.411 19.898 -175.493** -503.143 -599.315 
 
[0.280] [0.116] [0.006] [0.139] [0.788] [0.033] [0.138] [0.113] 
Strategic 16.079 243.553* -1,057.703 911.506 -4.994 135.497** 676.494 423.918 
 
[0.938] [0.070] [0.448] [0.157] [0.959] [0.034] [0.139] [0.146] 
Employee*Strategic 392.833** 311.599* 4,093.027*** 2,526.447*** 12.015 227.312*** 1,014.123** 622.409* 
  [0.044] [0.076] [0.005] [0.005] [0.888] [0.006] [0.021] [0.093] 
Size YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 4,950 3,960 
 
